D.S. v. Bayonne Board of Education by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-22-2010 
D.S. v. Bayonne Board of Education 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"D.S. v. Bayonne Board of Education" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 1406. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1406 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 08-4730
                    
                    
D.S., individually and as Guardian ad litem of D.S.,
A.S., individually and as Guardian ad litem of D.S.,
Appellants
v.
BAYONNE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2:08-CV-01726)
Honorable William J. Martini, District Judge
                    
Submitted March 9, 2010
                    
BEFORE: MCKEE, BARRY, and 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
Filed:  April 22, 2010
2                    
Lori M. Gaines
Staci J. Greenwald 
Sussan & Greenwald
1249 South River Road
Suite 104
Cranbury, NJ 08512
          Attorneys for Appellants
James L. Plosia, Jr.
Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, P.C.
25 Independence Boulevard
P.O. Box 112
Liberty Corner, NJ 07938
          Attorneys for Appellee
                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge
I.  INTRODUCTION
This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal
from an order of the District Court, entered on November 19,
2008, terminating the obligation of Appellee Bayonne Board
3of Education (“Bayonne”) to pay the tuition of Appellants’
son D.S. at the Banyan School, a private school for learning
disabled children in Little Falls, New Jersey, and denying
Appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and interest.
The District Court’s order reversed a decision of a New Jersey
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who held Bayonne liable
for the cost of D.S.’s tuition at the Banyan School.  The ALJ
ordered relief because of her conclusions that Bayonne had
failed to provide D.S. with a free and appropriate public
education during the 2006-2007 school year in violation of
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and that D.S.’s placement at the
Banyan School would satisfy the IDEA.  The District Court
adjudicated the case on the record compiled before the ALJ
but reached a conclusion opposite of that of the ALJ as the
Court believed that Bayonne had provided D.S. with a free
and appropriate public education.  For the reasons that follow,
we will reverse the order of the District Court and will
reinstate the decision of the ALJ.  We will provide, however,
that the Court on remand determine the details of the relief to
be granted to Appellants.
II.  BACKGROUND
Before setting forth a detailed analysis of the
proceedings and evidence and addressing Appellants’ claims
on the merits, we will outline the framework of the IDEA
pursuant to which states provide education to children with
disabilities.
4A. Statutory Framework
The IDEA requires that states to receive federal
education funding make available a free and appropriate
public education to all children with disabilities residing
within their borders.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).  In particular the
IDEA specifies that the education the states provide to these
children “specially [be] designed to meet the unique needs of
the handicapped child, supported by such services as are
necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction.”
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89, 102 S.Ct.
3034, 3042 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although a state is not required to supply an education to a
handicapped child that maximizes the child’s potential, it
must confer an education providing “significant learning” and
“meaningful benefit” to the child.  Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v.
N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999).  Thus, “the provision
of merely more than a trivial educational benefit” is
insufficient.  L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ.,
205 F.3d 572, 577 3d Cir. (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).  In addition to establishing educational standards,
the IDEA includes a “mainstreaming” component requiring
the placement of a student with disabilities in the least
restrictive environment that will provide the child with a
meaningful educational benefit.  Id.
The IDEA contemplates that school districts will
achieve these goals by designing and administering a program
of individualized instruction for each special education
student set forth in an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d).  The IEP is so significant
State and federal regulations detail the method for1
implementing the IDEA’s requirements.  S.H. v. State-Operated
Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2003).  New
Jersey’s requirements for developing an IEP follow the federal
requirements.  Id. (internal citations omitted).
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that the courts have characterized it as the “centerpiece” of the
IDEA’s system for delivering education to disabled children.
Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d
171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,
311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 598 (1988)).  “An IEP consists of a
specific statement of a student’s present abilities, goals for
improvement of the student’s abilities, services designed to
meet those goals, and a timetable for reaching the goals by
way of the services.”  Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist.,
205 F.3d 583, 589 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(20)).  A team consisting of the student’s parents and
teachers, a curriculum specialist from the local school district,
and, if requested, a person with special knowledge or
expertise regarding the student must develop an IEP.  20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).  The IEP team will review the IEP at
least annually to determine whether the stated goals for the
student are being achieved.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4).  When
appropriate the team will revise the IEP to address, among
other things, lack of progress, necessary changes arising from
reevaluation of the child, and parental input.  20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(4).   1
Though the IEP must provide the student with a “basic
floor of opportunity,” it need not necessarily provide “the
optimal level of services” that parents might desire for their
After Appellants initiated the administrative proceedings in this2
case, New Jersey enacted legislation placing the burdens of
proof and production on school districts in due process hearings
under the IDEA.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:46-1.1 (West 2009).
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child.  See Holmes, 205 F.3d at 590 (quoting Carlisle Area
Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Nevertheless, “at a minimum, ‘[t]he IEP must be reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful
educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual
potential.’”  Chambers v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d
176, 182 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd.
of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004)).  When a
state is unable to provide a free and appropriate public
education to a child but a private school can provide that
education, the state must reimburse the child’s parents for the
private school costs.  Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d at 389-
90 (citing Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d at 577).  
If parents believe that an IEP fails to provide their
child with a free and appropriate public education, they may
challenge the IEP in an administrative proceeding.  20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(6).  But in the apparent interest of minimizing the
stress and expense of an adjudicatory administrative
proceeding, New Jersey requires parents and a school board
disputing the adequacy of an IEP initially to mediate their
dispute.  Then, if mediation is unsuccessful, there will be a
“due process hearing” held before an ALJ to seek a resolution
of their dispute.  Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381
F.3d at 198.  At an administrative hearing challenging an IEP,
the party seeking relief bears the burden of proof.   Ramsey2
This legislation, however, has no bearing in this case, as it
applies only to due process hearings requested after January 13,
2008, the effective date of the act.  See id., historical and
statutory notes. 
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Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d at 392 (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 49, 62, 126 S.Ct. 528, 537 (2005)).  A party to the due
process hearing aggrieved by its outcome has the right to
bring a civil action challenging the decision in any state court
of competent jurisdiction or in a federal district court, without
regard to the amount in controversy.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). 
B. Factual Background
When D.S. was six years old, he began to suffer from
epileptic seizures attributable to brain tumors.  The treatment
for the seizures included the use of large quantities of anti-
epileptic medicine.  Unfortunately D.S.’s condition and
treatment combined to place severe limits on his cognitive
abilities as demonstrated by the circumstance that he had a
full scale IQ within the mentally retarded range.  D.S. began
attending Bayonne public schools in the second grade.  After
D.S. repeated the second grade, Bayonne classified him as
“other health impaired” and provided him with a special
education program in the third grade during the 2000-2001
school year.  D.S. underwent brain surgery in 2001 and 2003,
in which the tumors were removed successfully.  D.S.’s
seizures abated completely following the 2003 operation
allowing him to cease taking preventive medication.  As a
8result, although he still suffered from significant learning
difficulties, his condition improved.  Thereafter D.S.
remained a student in the Bayonne schools into the ninth
grade during the 2006-2007 school year.  At that level the
Bayonne schools placed D.S. in the school’s self-contained
“cluster” program in which special education teachers educate
special education students in a classroom environment distinct
from that of the general student population.
1. Report of Neuropsychologist Maria
DiDonato
Notwithstanding D.S.’s placement in the cluster
program, Appellants obviously were dissatisfied with D.S.’s
progress in the Bayonne schools for they retained the services
of several professionals to evaluate D.S. for a better
understanding of his educational needs and abilities.  Thus in
April and May of 2006, they retained a neuropsychologist, Dr.
Maria DiDonato, to administer a series of aptitude and
achievement tests to D.S. while he was in the eighth grade.
Based on an evaluation of D.S.’s cognitive reasoning skills
using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children IV
(“WISC IV”), DiDonato determined that D.S. had a full-scale
IQ score of 81, within the low average range of intellectual
functioning, signaling that his intellectual capacity had
improved following the surgeries.  Nevertheless, D.S.
evidenced below grade level achievement and in the Wechsler
Individual Achievement Test II (“WIAT”) scored at the 6.6
grade level for basic reading skills, the 4.2 grade level for
reading comprehension, the 7.2 grade level for numerical
9operations, the 5.4 grade level for math reasoning, the 5.5
grade level for spelling, and the 6.2 grade level for written
expression.  
DiDonato also administered the Standard Reading
Inventory-Second Edition test to D.S. which yielded results
indicating that his reading comprehension skills were at the
third-grade level and showed that he experienced fourth-grade
level frustration when reading.  In addition, DiDonato
determined, based on answers that D.S. and his parents
supplied in response to a behavioral health questionnaire, that
D.S.’s emotional health reflected clinically significant signs
of withdrawal, problems with attitude towards his school and
teachers, and internalization of problems causing feelings of
depression and inadequacy.  
Predicated on these evaluations, DiDonato
recommended, inter alia, moving D.S. away from distracting
stimuli during instruction, providing written instructions
verbally as well as on the blackboard, using repetition and
overlearning of novel information, rephrasing or representing
information in different words when there is evidence that
D.S. might not understand what is being asked or presented,
using multi-sensory instruction whenever possible, breaking
assignments into shorter tasks, teaching encoding strategies
such as mnemonics and “chunking,” allowing extra time for
tests, and, when possible, giving tests orally.
2. Report of Speech-Language Pathologist
Inna Levine
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DiDonato referred D.S to a speech-language
pathologist, Inna Levine of the Robert Wood Johnson
University Hospital.  Levine examined D.S. in June of 2006,
administering a series of tests to determine his strengths and
weaknesses in a variety of linguistic tasks.  The results of
these tests led Levine to conclude that although D.S.
displayed strengths in a number of areas—including
comprehension of direct commands, practical verbal
reasoning, problem solving, sentence comprehension, and
spelling—he had significant problems understanding oral
communications consisting of more than a sentence or two.
Levine found that D.S. struggled in that function to such an
extent that he was unable to process and retain any
information presented in a short one-paragraph narrative of
fourth or fifth grade level material.  Levine also noted that
D.S. struggled to express himself both orally and in writing
due to immature organization, immature vocabulary, and
insufficient specificity.  
Based on her observations, Levine recommended that
D.S.’s school provide him with individual pull-out speech
therapy three times a week to focus on auditory
comprehension, memory, and word finding, and additional
speech therapy two times a week in a small group setting to
focus on developing conversation skills and building
vocabulary.  Levine also recommended that these speech
therapy sessions address various “life skills” to help prepare
D.S. for post-school career planning.  But inasmuch as Levine
did not analyze D.S.’s reading comprehension ability, she
recommended that he meet with a reading specialist to
determine the optimal complexity of the instructional material
used in D.S.’s education.
In particular, Sgarlato-Inducci recommended that the school3
provide D.S. with intensive remediation instruction in reading,
writing, comprehension, and spelling using a research-driven
multisensory program such as the Lindamood-Bell, Wilson, or
Orton-Gillingham programs.
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3. Report of Audiologist Lorraine Sgarlato-
Inducci
Several months later on October 9, 2006, after D.S.
had begun his ninth grade year at Bayonne High School, his
parents took him to audiologist Dr. Lorraine Sgarlato-Inducci,
who like Levine, was from the Robert Wood Johnson
University Hospital, for a central auditory processing
assessment.  Sgarlato-Inducci concluded that D.S. displayed a
severe deficit in central auditory processing skills, with
specific deficits in the areas of auditory decoding, auditory
memory, phonemic conceptualization, and binaural
separation.  Thus, she concluded that D.S. had significant
difficulties processing and retaining verbal information.  Not
surprisingly, these difficulties were magnified both by the
presence of auditory distractions and an increase in the length
of the verbal information to be processed.  Sgarlato-Inducci
recommended, inter alia, that the school provide D.S. with
intensive speech therapy, small group language-based
instruction on an ongoing basis, and instruction using a multi-
sensory educational and remedial approach.   She also3
recommended that the teachers provide information to D.S. in
small, easily decipherable “chunks” to facilitate
comprehension, storage, and recall, and that the teachers seat
him away from possible distractions.  Moreover, she
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recommended that the teachers test him in an untimed and
quiet environment, repeat and rephrase information as needed,
and use an FM desk-top amplification system to help D.S.
hear their voices over ambient noise in the classroom.
4. The 2006-2007 IEP
In letters they sent on June 8, July 13, September 6,
and October 30, 2006, Appellants shared the evaluations they
had obtained from DiDonato, Levine, and Sgarlato-Inducci
with Bayonne and requested to meet with a child study team
from Bayonne High School to incorporate the findings and
recommendations from those evaluations into D.S.’s ninth
grade IEP.  Although Bayonne initially did not respond to
Appellants’ letters, eventually there was an IEP meeting to
consider D.S.’s case in November 2006.  Appellants, D.S.’s
teachers, his case manager Sharon Peraino, and DiDonato
attended that meeting.  In the letters preceding the IEP
meeting and at the meeting itself, Appellants expressed
concern that D.S. was not making sufficient academic
progress in the Bayonne public school system.   
An updated IEP was issued on November 29, 2006,
summarizing the reports of DiDonato, Levine, and Sgarlato-
Inducci, and D.S.’s teachers’ comments for the 2006-2007
school year.  By and large, D.S.’s teachers indicated that D.S.
was a polite, pleasant, and hard-working student, albeit
somewhat shy, and that he was meeting academic
expectations, even though he at times struggled in certain
areas.  D.S.’s English and language arts teachers noted that he
“Use manipulative” appears in that form in the original.4
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had difficulties with vocabulary, grammar, comprehension,
and recall.  D.S.’s pre-algebra teacher noted that he struggled
when taking tests, becoming nervous and anxious, but that if
given the same assignment without calling it a “test” he would
achieve a grade of 90% or above.  
For each area of D.S.’s instruction, the IEP
recomm ended  the  fo l low ing  m o d i f ica t io ns  and
accommodations:
Tests/exams may be taken in the special education
classroom with extended time
Homework assignments may be modified as needed
Classwork may be modified as needed
Criteria for grading may be modified
Extra set of textbooks may be kept at home
Tests/exams may be reformatted
Tests may be administered orally
Directions may be repeated/rephrased/clarified
Break down tasks into manageable units
Provide student with preferential seating
Provide student with study guides
Highlight key words 
. . . . 
Provide a highly structured environment




App. at 121-32.  Appellants, however, refused to sign the
updated IEP because they believed that it failed to address
D.S.’s educational needs.  Nevertheless, because they did not
submit any additional proposals to modify the IEP, and did
not seek to challenge the IEP through mediation or at a due
process hearing, the IEP became effective 15 days after
Appellants had received it.  See N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-
2.3(h) (2010).
5. Dr. DiDonato’s Classroom Observation
Appellants continued to consult outside evaluators
throughout the 2006-2007 school year.  At their request and
with Bayonne’s permission, DiDonato observed D.S. at
Bayonne High School on January 5, 2007, from
approximately 9:20 A.M. until 1:30 P.M., for the purpose of
evaluating his educational program.  In particular she
observed classes in mathematics, general science, English,
introduction to technology, world history, gym, and lunch.
Based on her observations, DiDonato issued a report
reflecting her conclusions that the educational program
Bayonne High School was supplying D.S. was inappropriate
for his specific learning needs.  According to DiDonato, in
most of the classes she observed, D.S. struggled to process
information quickly enough to keep up with the pace of
instruction.  She also noted that D.S. seemed to be
experiencing difficulty interacting socially with other
students.
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Although in some instances DiDonato criticized D.S.’s
teachers for failing to comply with the IEP—such as by not
providing a quiet environment for test-taking—she placed
greater blame on the IEP itself, concluding that “[t]he goals
and objectives in the IEP and the current instructional
program being implemented do not adequately address the
needs that have been identified.”  App. at 155.  Ultimately,
DiDonato concluded that D.S. required “placement within a
small, highly structured school for students with learning
disabilities” as only such a school would be able to address
D.S.’s academic and social needs.  Id. at 157.  On March 19,
2007, after they received DiDonato’s report, Appellants
commenced the administrative proceedings underlying this
appeal by filing a petition for a due process hearing with the
New Jersey Department of Education Office of Special
Education seeking an order directing Bayonne to pay for an
out-of-district placement for D.S. at the Banyan School.
6. Expert Report of Dr. Brooks
After they initiated the administrative proceedings,
Appellants sought and obtained a report on D.S.’s case from
Dr. Jill Brooks, a licensed speech and language pathologist
and clinical neuropsychologist.  Brooks interviewed
Appellants and reviewed D.S.’s medical and educational
record from 1997, when D.S.’s tumors first were diagnosed,
until 2007, including the 2006 IEP and DiDonato’s in-class
observation reports.   Based on this review, Brooks concurred
with the evaluations and recommendations that other
professionals who had met with D.S. had made, and
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emphasized the need for a structured, intensive reading
program—such as the Lindamood-Bell, Wilson, or Orton-
Gillingham programs—and recommended that D.S.
participate in a social skills group for training in social skills
and pragmatic language.  In her analysis of the education that
Bayonne was providing to D.S., Brooks was “struck by the
minimal services offered to [D.S.] throughout his academic
career,” and concluded that Bayonne had “not taken the
responsibility of evaluating or remediating” any of D.S.’s
academic and behavioral problems.  App. at 177.  
7. Hackler and Wilkinson Evaluations
Though Appellants had obtained numerous evaluations
of D.S., the evaluation process was not one-sided for in May
2007 Bayonne designated learning consultant Lucy Hackley
and school psychologist Mary Beth Wilkinson to evaluate
D.S. to determine his cognitive level.  Hackler administered
Woodcock-Johnson III (“Woodcock-Johnson”) achievement
tests to gauge D.S.’s grade-level proficiency in several
academic areas.  In these tests D.S. scored at the 3.8 grade
level for reading comprehension, the 6.8 grade level for math
calculation, the 5.3 grade level for math reasoning, the 5.7
grade level for basic writing skills, and the 5.8 grade level for
written expression.  In each of these subject areas in terms of
grade-level equivalence D.S. scored lower than he had scored
approximately one year earlier when he took the WIAT
achievement test that DiDonato administered.   Wilkinson’s
psychological evaluation consisted of an IQ test and a
Multidimensional Self Concept Scale exam, which assessed
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social-emotional adjustment.  D.S’s IQ was assessed using the
WISC-IV test at 78, within the borderline range of intellectual
functioning.  When D.S. had taken this test approximately one
year earlier, the result was a slightly higher IQ score of 81,
within the low average range of intellectual functioning.  On
the Multidimensional Self Concept Scale exam, D.S. received
a total score of 70, indicating that he had a very negative self-
image.
8. D.S.’s Final Grades for the 2006-2007
School Year
At the completion of the 2006-2007 school year, D.S.
received a cumulative final grade point average of 92 for his
major subjects.  He received scores of 95 in general sciences,
95 in English, 93 in language arts, 87 in math, and 90 in world
history.  His overall cumulative grade point average in major
subjects for the 2006-2007 school year increased over his
previous averages for in each of the previous four years D.S.
had received an average in the mid to high 80s. 
C. Procedural History
1. State Administrative Proceedings
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In early 2007, while D.S. was in ninth grade,
Appellants concluded that Bayonne was failing to provide
D.S. with a free and appropriate public education, a
conclusion leading them on March 19, 2007, as we already
have indicated, to file their petition for a due process hearing
challenging Bayonne’s education treatment of D.S.  The
Department of Education transmitted the case to the New
Jersey Office of Administrative Law which assigned an ALJ
to the case who conducted the hearing over a period of
months in 2007. 
At the hearing, the ALJ reviewed the reports that the
parties had compiled and heard testimony from D.S.’s father
as well as from a number of educators and health
professionals who had worked with or evaluated D.S.  There
was substantial focus at the hearing on determining the
significance of D.S.’s high final grades for the 2006-2007
school year in light of the decrease in grade-level proficiency
when his 2007 scores on the Woodcock-Johnson tests were
compared to his 2006 scores on the WIAT tests.   It is clear
that Bayonne’s witnesses, in particular D.S.’s teachers and his
case manager Peraino, believed that D.S.’s high marks in all
of his classes demonstrated that D.S. had made academic
progress during the 2006-2007 school year.  To Bayonne
these high marks seemed particularly significant because its
Director of Special Services Carol Trojan and its learning
consultant Hackler testified that standardized test scores were
not a reliable indicator of academic progress.  Yet there was a
clear and well-defined dispute between the two camps of
expert witnesses with respect to the significance of the results
of standardized testing when compared to the grades in
school.  In this regard we point out that contrary to Trojan’s
19
and Hackler’s views, DiDonato, Banyan School consulting
psychiatrist Dr. Steven Tobias, and Brooks testified that
standardized tests were a better measure of academic progress
than grades, which can be subjective.  Through their
testimony and evaluation reports, Appellants’ witnesses
expressed their belief that D.S. was not receiving meaningful
educational benefits at Bayonne High School.
On March 6, 2008, the ALJ issued her decision.  After
reviewing “the applicable law, the evidence and credible
testimony,” she made 71 separate findings of facts.  App. at
39.  These findings included her conclusions that the
November 2006 IEP conference was completed without
agreeing to incorporate into the IEP any of the
recommendations outlined in the reports from the
neuropsychological, speech-language, and central auditory
processing evaluations, or from teachers.  Moreover, she
found that the IEP did not provide goals or address D.S.’s
need for reading and language remediation and speech
therapy or his weak auditory memory skills and socialization
issues.
The ALJ ultimately concluded that Bayonne had failed
to create an IEP for D.S. sufficient to address his educational
needs, and that as a result D.S. had not received a free and
appropriate public education conferring a meaningful
educational benefit in the least restrictive environment, and
thus his education did not satisfy federal law.  After
considering the testimony from the psychologist at the
Banyan School and taking into consideration the evaluations
and assessments regarding D.S.’s educational and social
needs, the ALJ concluded that the Banyan School would be
According to Appellants’ brief, the Banyan School placement5
has been continued at their expense since the time that the
District Court reversed the decision of the ALJ thereby relieving
Bayonne of the obligation to pay D.S.’s expenses at that school.
The parties in their briefs do not indicate that they offered to6
present live evidence in the District Court.
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an appropriate placement and ordered his placement there at
Bayonne’s expense, a direction carried out in April 2008.  5
2. District Court Proceedings
Following the ALJ’s decision and D.S.’s transfer to the
Banyan School, Appellants filed a complaint in the District
Court requesting reimbursement from Bayonne for attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in the administrative action pursuant
to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).  Bayonne countered with its
own complaint requesting that the District Court reverse the
ALJ’s decision providing for the Banyan School placement.
The District Court consolidated the cases and, on the basis of
the record from the administrative proceedings, in a letter
opinion dated November 14, 2008, and order entered
November 19, 2008, denied Appellants’ request for
reimbursement for attorney’s fees and costs and reversed the
decision of the ALJ as the Court concluded that Bayonne had
provided D.S. with an education that met federal requirements
in its public schools.   The Court predicated its conclusion6
principally on the bases that D.S. had received high grades
21
during the 2006-2007 school year, an achievement that it
believed the ALJ failed to consider, and its belief that the ALJ
“over-relied on D.S.’s standardized test scores when reaching
her decision.”  App. at 11.  Furthermore, the Court also
considered that D.S.’s teachers were using a multi-sensory
learning approach and were following certain of Appellants’
consultants’ recommendations.
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the
decision of the state educational agency under 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2), and we exercise jurisdiction over the final order of
the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When
considering an appeal from a state administrative decision
under the IDEA, district courts apply a nontraditional
standard of review, sometimes referred to as “modified de
novo” review.  See P.P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585
F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting S.H. v. State-Operated
Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Under this standard, a district court must give “due weight”
and deference to the findings in the administrative
proceedings.  Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. at
3051).  “‘Factual findings from the administrative
proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct,’ and if
the reviewing court does not adhere to those findings, it is
‘obliged to explain why.’”  Id. (quoting State-Operated Sch.
Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d at 270).  The “due weight”
obligation prevents district courts from imposing their own
view of preferable educational methods on the states.  Oberti
22
v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051).
Even though on an appeal in an IDEA case from a
decision of an ALJ a district court exercises a modified de
novo standard of review, when, as here, an ALJ has heard live
testimony and determined that one witness is more credible
than another witness, her determination is due special weight.
Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 199.
“Specifically, this means that a District Court must accept the
state agency’s credibility determinations ‘unless the non-
testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a
contrary conclusion.’”  Id. (quoting Carlisle Area Sch., 62
F.3d at 529) (emphasis in original).  In Shore we opined that
in this context, the word “justify” requires that the applicable
standard of review be essentially the same as that a federal
appellate court applies when reviewing a trial court’s findings
of fact.  Id.
Within the confines of these standards, a district court
is authorized to make findings based on the preponderance of
the evidence and grant the relief it deems appropriate,
including an award of attorney’s fees, a requirement for
reimbursement for a private educational placement, and a
direction for the provision of a compensatory education.  See
A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir.
2007) (en banc); Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993
F.2d 1031, 1034 (3d Cir. 1993).  We review a district court’s
findings of fact for clear error, but we exercise plenary review
over the legal standards that a district court applies and over
its legal conclusions.  Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia,
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575 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Shore Reg’l High
Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 199).
IV.  DISCUSSION
The District Court reversed the ALJ’s finding that
D.S.’s ninth grade IEP was inappropriate.  “The issue of
whether an IEP is appropriate is a question of fact.”  State-
Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d at 271 (citing
Carlisle Area Sch., 62 F.3d at 526).  “When parents challenge
[the adequacy of] a school’s provision of a [free and
appropriate public education] to a child, a reviewing court
must (1) consider whether the school district complied with
the IDEA’s procedural requirements and (2) determine
whether the educational program was ‘reasonably calculated
to enable the child to receive educational benefits.’”  Mary T.,
575 F.3d at 249 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct.
at 3051).  But a court should determine the appropriateness of
an IEP as of the time it was made, and should use evidence
acquired subsequently to the creation of an IEP only to
evaluate the reasonableness of the school district’s decisions
at the time that they were made.  Susan N. v. Wilson Sch.
Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 762 (3d Cir. 1995). 
A. Bayonne Complied with the IDEA’s Procedural
Requirements
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The Supreme Court has made clear that the IDEA’s
“procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid,” as “Congress
placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with
procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of
participation at every stage of the administrative process, as it
did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a
substantive standard.”  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06, 102 S.Ct.
at 3050 (internal citation omitted).  Appellants argue that
Bayonne ran afoul of the IDEA’s procedural requirements
because (1) D.S.’s ninth-grade IEP failed to program for
D.S.’s areas of educational need, and (2) Bayonne failed to
make timely responses to the letters Appellants sent to
Bayonne on June 8, July 13, September 6, and October 30,
2006, requesting a meeting to discuss creating a ninth grade
IEP for D.S. that incorporated the recommendations of
Appellants’ private evaluators.  
Appellants’ first argument misses the mark.  The
content of an IEP as such does not implicate the IDEA’s
procedural requirements for content is concerned with the
IEP’s substance, i.e., whether the IEP “reasonably [is]
calculated to enable to enable the child to receive educational
benefits.”  Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051.   Appellants’ second
argument, however, does present a procedural question.  New
Jersey regulations require a school district to respond in
writing within 20 calendar days to inquiries such as those
Appellants made in their letters.  See N.J. Admin. Code §
6A:14-2.3(h)(5) (2010).  Appellants’ letters, however,
remained unanswered for months.  The District Court did not
specifically address the implications of this delay, but it
nevertheless found that the IDEA’s procedural requirements
were satisfied because Appellants played a “significant role”
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in crafting D.S.’s IEP.  See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,
53, 126 S.Ct. 528, 532 (2005).  
We agree with the District Court on this point.  A
procedural violation is actionable under the IDEA only if it
results in a loss of educational opportunity for the student,
seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or
causes a deprivation of educational benefits.  Winkelman v.
Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26, 127 S.Ct. 1994,
2001 (2007) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)); J.L. v. Mercer
Island Sch. Dist. 592 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2010).  Thus,
though it is important that a school district comply with the
IDEA’s procedural requirements, rather than being a goal in
itself, such compliance primarily is significant because of the
requirements’ impact on students’ and parents’ substantive
rights.  Here although Bayonne’s initial unresponsiveness in
the face of Appellants’ concerns was unfortunate and
undoubtedly frustrating to them, they ultimately had an
opportunity to participate meaningfully in the creation of an
IEP for D.S. that was in effect for most of his ninth-grade
year.  Appellants and one of their outside experts (DiDonato)
were present at the November 2006 IEP meeting at which
they made suggestions, some of which were incorporated in
the IEP.  Moreover, the revised IEP was presented to
Appellants for their approval.  
We are mindful that Appellants did not sign the IEP,
but we have found levels of parental involvement similar to
those in this case to be sufficient to comply with the IDEA.
See Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1036.  Though Appellants contend
that D.S. was deprived of educational benefits, this alleged
deprivation cannot reasonably be traced to Bayonne’s delay in
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responding to Appellants’ letters.  In these circumstances we
find that Bayonne substantially satisfied the IDEA’s
procedural requirements and that any deficiency in its
compliance with the requirements is not a basis for granting
relief to Appellants.
B. The District Court Failed to Afford Due Weight
to the ALJ’s Factual Findings
We now come to the heart of this appeal.  In her
decision, the ALJ found, “based on the scoring results from
evaluations and assessments and the weight of testimony from
teachers and medical experts,” that D.S.’s ninth grade IEP
failed to incorporate the recommendations necessary to
address D.S.’s needs, which included: 
reading goals, individualized basic phonetics
training, placement in a multi-sensory reading
program that addresses reading comprehension
skills (Lindamood-Bell, Wilson, or the Orton-
Gillingham), intensive speech/language therapy,
intensive auditory therapy regimens, an
academic environment for small group
lang uag e-based  c lass room  ins t ruc t ion ,
remediation instruction for reading, writing,
comprehension and spelling, usage of visual
aids, FM desk-top amplification system and
other educational supports. 
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App. at 57.  The absence of these recommendations, or any
alternatives reasonably calculated to confer an educational
benefit to D.S., led the ALJ to find the IEP inappropriate.  
The District Court reversed this finding because D.S.’s
ninth grade IEP indicated that his teachers were using a multi-
sensory learning approach and rephrasing and restating
instructions when necessary as recommended by Appellants’
educational consultants, the IEP incorporated a number of the
consultants’ other proposed recommendations, and, most
significantly, D.S. received high marks in his ninth grade
classes.  The Court acknowledged that the IEP failed to
contain reading goals and did not include all of the
recommendations of the educational consultants, but stated
that “even without these goals, D.S. received meaningful
educational benefit during the 2006-2007 school year, as
evidenced by the high marks D.S. earned.”  App. at 14.
We agree with the District Court that the IEP did
incorporate certain instructional techniques that were
consistent with Appellants’ consultants’ recommendations,
such as “[t]ests/exams may be taken in the special education
classroom with extended time,” “[d]irections may be
repeated/rephrased/clarified,” “[b]reak down tasks into
manageable units,” “[p]rovide student with preferential
seating,” “[u]se drill and repetitive practice,” and “[u]se
multi-sensory approach.”  App. at 121-32.  Nevertheless, we
disagree with the District Court that the presence of these
generalized instructions in the IEP contradicts the ALJ’s
ultimate factual conclusions—which a reviewing court is
obliged to consider prima facie correct—that (1) in order for
D.S.’s ninth grade IEP to be reasonably calculated to enable
For example, the reports of Sgarlato-Inducci and Brooks both7
stated that D.S. needed an intensive remedial multi-sensory
program for instruction in reading comprehension and writing,
and recommended the use for that purpose of a program such as
the Lindamood-Bell, Wilson, or Orton-Gillingham programs.
By holding that inclusion of such a program was necessary for
D.S. to receive a meaningful educational benefit, the ALJ
implicitly accepted these reports as credible.  In contrast to these
specific recommendations, the IEP recommends only that D.S.’s
English instructors “[u]se multi-sensory approach.”  App. at
121-22.  This recommendation, as well as all the others in the
“Goals and Objectives” section of the IEP, is repeated verbatim
for each subject area.
We hasten to add that we are not holding that an IEP
must incorporate specific remedial techniques and provisions for
accommodations merely because evaluators propose them.
After all, the team may have good reason to reject these
proposals.  Thus, we only are deciding that on this record the
ALJ’s conclusions with respect to remedial techniques and
provisions for accommodations are unassailable and our opinion
should not be read overly broadly.
28
D.S. to receive a meaningful educational benefit, it needed to
incorporate the specific remedial techniques and provisions
for accommodations that the teachers and evaluators who
worked with him had proposed, and (2) the IEP failed to
incorporate these specific remedial techniques and provisions
for accommodations.  7
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As we have indicated, the District Court also found
that the IEP was appropriate because the high grades that he
received in all of his classes demonstrated that he made
meaningful academic progress during his ninth grade year.  It
certainly was reasonable for the Court to consider D.S.’s
academic progress in evaluating the appropriateness of the
IEP for “evidence of a student’s later educational progress
may [] be considered in determining whether the original IEP
was reasonably calculated to afford some educational
benefit.”  Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1040.  Moreover, the
Supreme Court has indicated that a special education student
who “is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public
school system” and who is performing well enough to
advance from grade to grade generally will be considered to
be receiving a meaningful educational benefit under the
IDEA.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 3049.
Nevertheless, though the Court has stated that the “grading
and advancement system” constitutes “an important factor in
determining educational benefit,” it also has made clear that it
was not holding “that every handicapped child who is
advancing from grade to grade in a regular public school
system is automatically receiving a ‘free appropriate public
education.’”  Id. at 203 & n.25, 102 S.Ct. at 3049 & n.25. 
D.S., however, was not being educated in Bayonne’s
regular classrooms.  To the contrary, Bayonne was giving him
all of his academic instruction in classes composed entirely of
special education students in its “cluster” program.  The
District Court apparently did not view this distinction as
significant because “[i]n Bayonne, state core curriculum
standards underlie the core curriculum content for all of its
students, including special education students.”  App. at 11.
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Rowley, however, does not support the District Court’s
position that high scores achieved in special education
classrooms are unambiguous evidence of an IEP’s
sufficiency.  In this regard it is important to reiterate  that in
Rowley the Supreme Court made its statements regarding the
limited significance of grade-to-grade advancement in the
situation before it in which the “mainstreaming” preference of
the IDEA had been met and the Court was “presented with a
handicapped child . . . who is performing above average in the
regular classrooms of a public school system.”  Rowley, 458
U.S. at 202-03, 102 S.Ct. at 3049 (emphasis added).  Thus,
our reading of Rowley leads us to believe that when the
“mainstreaming” preference has not been met so that high
grades are achieved in classes with only special education
students set apart from the regular classes of a public school
system, the grades are of less significance than grades
obtained in regular classrooms.
Moreover, quite aside from Rowley, our precedents do
not afford the significance the District Court afforded to
D.S.’s high scores in special education classrooms in this case
for we consistently have declined to adopt bright line rules to
determine whether a student is receiving a meaningful
educational benefit under the IDEA.  See, e.g., Ridgewood
Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 247 (what benefit is “appropriate”
under the IDEA is gauged in relation to child’s potential);
Polk, 853 F.2d at 184 (“The educational progress of a
handicapped child . . . can be understood as a continuum
where the point of regression versus progress is less relevant
than the conferral of benefit.”); Carlisle Area Sch., 62 F.3d at
534 (“. . . the [IDEA] requires that school districts prepare the
IEP’s based on the student’s needs; so long as the IEP
We are not implying that we question the integrity of8
Bayonne’s marking system for special education students.  Quite
to the contrary, we merely are considering the significance of
D.S.’s achievements within the context of the entire case.
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responds to the needs, its ultimate success or failure cannot
retroactively render it inappropriate.”).  Overall, we think that
it is clear that a court should not place conclusive significance
on special education classroom scores, a conclusion that we
believe is reinforced by the circumstance that, as here, there
may be a disconnect between a school’s assessment of a
student in a special education setting and his achievements in
that setting and the student’s achievements in standardized
testing.   When there is such a disconnect we think that there8
should be an especially close examination of the
appropriateness of the student’s education.
 We recognize that the District Court reached its
conclusion on the basis of  testimony from Carol Trojan,
Bayonne’s Director of Special Services, who testified in the
administrative proceedings that D.S., by receiving high marks
in his special education classes, demonstrated mastery of the
regular ninth grade curriculum just as if he was in a regular
classroom, and whose testimony was recorded in the ALJ’s
decision.  Appellants’ witnesses, on the other hand,
thoughtfully expressed their beliefs that D.S. had not made
grade level progress during the 2006-2007 school year.  App.
at 21-23 (summarizing DiDonato’s testimony).  The ALJ
chose to credit Appellants’ witnesses, and, under the
applicable standard of review the District Court was not at
liberty to credit the witnesses who expressed a contrary
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opinion without a showing that there was good reason to do
so, a showing that Bayonne did not make.  See Shore Reg’l
High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 200. 
The District Court also supported its conclusion by
stating that the ALJ over-relied on D.S.’s standardized test
scores, i.e., his 2006 scores on the WIAT tests and his 2007
scores on the Woodcock-Johnson tests.   The Court stated that
Appellants had failed to meet their burden of showing that an
apt comparison can be made between scores from the two
different types of tests.  But the ALJ heard testimony
regarding the standardized testing and on the basis of that
testimony used the test results to measure D.S.’s progress.
Moreover, the District Court did not point to nontestimonial
evidence that undermined the ALJ’s conclusion on this point.
If we give as we should “due weight” to the ALJ’s
determination that D.S.’s ninth grade IEP was not reasonably
calculated to enable D.S. to receive a meaningful educational
benefit, we find no basis in the record for overturning that
determination.  See Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381
F.3d at 201.  Accordingly, the District Court’s contradictory
determination was clearly erroneous.  See id.  
V.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the
order of the District Court of November 19, 2008, and remand
the case for entry of judgment in favor of the Appellants to
the end that the ALJ’s decision of March 6, 2008, that
Bayonne was not supplying D.S. with a free and appropriate
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public education and that the Banyan School would be an
appropriate placement so that D.S. be placed in that school at
Bayonne’s expense, is reinstated.  In this regard we note that
Appellants in their brief indicate that they are seeking
reimbursement for their tuition and transportation costs in
continuing D.S. in the Banyan School after the District Court
reversed the ALJ’s decision.  We, however, will leave the
determination of the precise relief to be given to Appellants to
the District Court on the remand.  In addition on the remand
the District Court should determine the amount of attorney’s
fees, costs, and interest for which Bayonne is responsible.
